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Abstract
This thesis aims to show that with proper resource management, cross-functional communication, and
organizational structure manufacturing and supply chain organizations can minimize the adverse impacts
of organizational and process complexity and grow for the future. To do this we study at the
pharmaceutical industry and Novartis Pharma Technical Operations ("TechOps"). We conduct employee
interviews, benchmark across global industries, case study two representative products, and turn to the
field of system dynamics to map the relationships over time. This paper will prove that the generic
dynamic model of production and supply issues presented can be directly applied to the situation at
TechOps and other large manufacturing companies. We will use this and our knowledge of future
changes to determine the best next steps for organizational improvements.
As the pharmaceutical industry evolves, TechOps has an increasing need to be more agile and flexible to
the changing market environments. The Vision 2015 for TechOps is to look beyond manufacturing alone
to become a world-class supply organization. In other words, TechOps not only needs to have the
technical expertise they have built through their functional divisions, but also brand ownership and global
optimization of product production. Through our research, we see that TechOps will not be able to
achieve this goal if they do not reverse the adverse impacts of their complex supply chain through better
end-to-end visibility and organizational enhancements. However, moving directly into an organization
structure that is based solely on product lines would not fit strategically and culturally with the
organization. Furthermore, since TechOps has always been divided along manufacturing functions, there
are few resources that have the experience and insight across the various operations; TechOps needs to
build these capabilities into their organization over time.
Therefore, we recommend that TechOps explore the enhancement of the Supply SChain Brand Lead role into an established owner of the end-to-end supply
process for identified products, look into establishing a Manufacturing
Services and Technology (MS&T) group that will own technical process
changes among the functions and revise the Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) to optimize performance end-to-end, be brand focused, expose ol
complexity and trigger proactive responses. All of these changes should
be facilitated by additional communication tools and incentives.
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Title: Professor of Statistics & Mgmt Science, Director CCREMS, Sloan School of Management
3
This page intentionally left blank
4
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Leaders for Global Operations program (LGO) and Novartis Pharma AG for
making this internship experience possible.
Thanks to Novartis
I would like to thank my supervisor, Jena-Francois Guilland for his management and endorsement.
Thanks to everyone on my core team: Carman Doran, Deepa Xavier, Ulrich Bellot and Nazeli Dertsakian
and the steering committee: Jonathon Rucker, Maeve Devlin, Serge Runser, and Thomas Proellfor their
valuable time, support, and participation.
Thank you to the process unit teams at the sites in Stein, Huningue, Ringaskiddy and Grimsby for
arranging visits and participating in my studies.
Finally, a specific thanks to Tom van Laar, Head of Pharma's Global Technical Operations and his
continued support of LGO and MIT projects in general.
Thanks to MIT
I would like to thank my MIT advisors: Charles Cooney and Roy Welsh for their insight, support and
assistance throughout the internship. I would also like to thank my reader, Don Rosenfeld for his support
of this work.
I wanted to specially recognize Thomas Allen, Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management at MIT,
who not only set the precedence for a large portion of the scientific studies in this thesis, but also gave me
his time and guidance with the design of my study. I also wanted to thanks Dr. Mareike Heinzen. Chair of
Technology and Innovation Management of ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) Zurich for her
collaboration and recommendations in this study. And finally I would like to thanks Professor J. Bradley
Morrison for his guidance on building the Systems Dynamics model.
Lastly, I would like to thank my classmates in LGO, particularly David Hilliard and Mary Anito for their
feedback and advice, and my friends and family for their continued encouragement throughout the years.
5
This page intentionally left blank.
6
Table of Contents
A b stra ct ................................................................................................................................................. 3
Acknowledgm ents.................................................................................................................................. 5
Table of Figures .................................................................................................................................... 10
1 Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 12
1.1 Thesis M otivation .................................................................................................................. 12
1.1 Problem Statement ................................................................................................................. 13
1.2 Hypothesis and Approach................................................................................................... 13
1.3 Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................................ 14
2 Chapter 2: Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 16
2.1 System Dynam ics M odeling...................................................................................................16
2.2 Organizational Design............................................................................................................17
2.3 Defining Complexity and the Organizational/Process Complexity Face .............................. 18
2.4 Communication Studies .................................................................................................... 21
2.5 Sumam ary ............................................................................................................................... 22
3 Chapter 3: System s Dynamics M odeling ..................................................................................... 23
3.1 Base M odel - Production and Supply Issues ........................................................................ 23
3.1.1 Product Launches ....................................................................................................... 24
3.1.2 Production Issues............................................................................................................ 24
3.1.3 Supply Issues.................................................................................................................. 25
3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 26
3.3 Implications of the Base M odel .......................................................................................... 27
3.4 Adding in Organizational Complexity, Process Complexity and Communication factors ..... 27
3.5 Sum m ary ............................................................................................................................... 29
4 Chapter 4: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Novartis Pharma.................................................... 30
4.1 The Pharmaceutical Industry Background - Related Trends and Challenges ....................... 30
4.2 Background of Novartis Pharma.......................................................................................... 31
4.3 Sum m ary ............................................................................................................................... 32
5 Chapter 5: Understanding Organizational Complexity through Current State Analysis of TechOps
Organizational Structure........................................................................................................................ 33
5.1 TechOps Organizational structure........................................................................................ 33
7
5.2 Initiating the Need for Change: TechOps Strategic Vision and Key Initiatives .................... 34
5.2.1 Process Oriented Organization (P0O)........................................................................ 35
5.2.2 Complexity Reduction and Brand Rationalization Initiative ....................................... 36
5.2.3 Continuous M anufacturing ......................................................................................... 36
5.3 Diagnosing Organizational Com plexity .............................................................................. 37
5.4 Application of the Model with TechOps Organizational Complexity ................................... 38
5.5 Sum m ary ............................................................................................................................... 39
6 Chapter 6: Understanding Process Complexity through Physical Product Flow, Information Flow
and Value Stream M apping ................................................................................................................... 40
6.1 Product 1: Sm all m olecule product with high growth potential ............................................ 41
6.2 Product 2: Large molecule product with high value but low volume ................................... 45
6.2.1 Physical Flow ................................................................................................................. 45
6.2.2 Inform ation Flow ............................................................................................................ 46
6.3 Application of M odel with TechOps Process Complexity ................................................... 47
6.4 Sum m ary ............................................................................................................................... 48
7 Chapter 7: Understanding Communication Effectiveness through a Communications Study...........49
7.1 Participation........................................................................................................................... 49
7.2 Survey Design........................................................................................................................ 50
7.3 Assumptions and Caveats................................................................................................... 51
7.4 Results ................................................................................................................................... 51
7.4.1 Self-Assessm ent Results .............................................................................................. 51
7.4.2 Daily Log Results ....................................................................................................... 52
7.5 Application of the Model on TechOps Communication Effectiveness ................................. 56
7.6 Sum m ary ............................................................................................................................... 56
8 Chapter 8: Recom m endations, Conclusions and N ext Steps........................................................ 57
8.1 3-Lens Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 57
8.1.1 Strategic Design ............................................................................................................. 57
8.1.2 Cultural.......................................................................................................................... 58
8.1.3 Political.......................................................................................................................... 58
8.2 Recom m endation: Organization Changes and Tools ............................................................ 58
8.3 Com munication......................................................................................................................60
8.4 Follow-on Studies .................................................................................................................. 61
8
8.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................... 62
APPENDIX A : Comm unication Study Details................................................................................... 63
Part 1: Self Assessment...................................................................................................................... 63
Part 2: Daily Log ............................................................................................................................... 64
APPENDIX B: W orks Cited .................................................................................................................. 65
9
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Fire-Fighting Dynamic Diagram ......................................................................................... 17
Figure 2: Organizational Design Strategies ......................................................................................... 18
Figure 3: Complexity Cube.................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 4: Complexity Cube VA & NVA ............................................................................................ 19
Figure 5: Organization-Process Complexity Relationship................................................................... 20
F igure 6 : A llen C urve ............................................................................................................................ 2 1
Figure 7: Issue Dynamics - Base Model............................................................................................ 23
Figure 8: Product Launches ................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 9: Production Issues Base M odel ........................................................................................... 25
Figure 10: Supply Issues Base Case ................................................................................................... 26
Figure 11: Total Time Consumed per Task ....................................................................................... 27
Figure 12: M odel with Complexity and Communication Factors ........................................................ 28
Figure 13: Novartis Pharma Organizational Structure ....................................................................... 31
Figure 14: TechOps Global Network ................................................................................................ 32
Figure 15: Current TechOps Organizational Structure........................................................................ 33
Figure 16: TechOps Vision Transition ................................................................................................ 34
Figure 17: POO (Novartis Pharma, TechOps copyright 2009)............................................................ 35
Figure 18: Continuous M anufacturing Diagram ................................................................................. 37
Figure 19: Application of M odel............................................................................................................38
Figure 20: TechOps Order Fulfillment Process .................................................................................. 40
Figure 21: Product 1 Production Process............................................................................................ 42
Figure 22: Product I Information Flow .............................................................................................. 43
Figure 23: Product 1 Information flow for Push Process .................................................................... 43
Figure 24: Product 1 Information Flow for Pull Process ..................................................................... 44
Figure 25: Product 1 Value Stream M ap ............................................................................................ 44
Figure 26: Product 2 Production Process Flow Diagram...................................................................... 46
Figure 27: Product 2 Information Flow Diagram ............................................................................... 46
Figure 28: Department Breakdown of Requested Participant............................................................... 49
Figure 29: Department Breakdown of Actual Participants ................................................................... 50
Figure 30: Communication M edia Amount ....................................................................................... 50
Figure 31: Breakdown of Face-to-Face Communication...................................................................... 51
Figure 32: Breakdown of Phone Communication.............................................................................. 52
Figure 33: Breakdown of Email Communication Daily Log Results ................................................. 52
Figure 34: Allen Curve - All Participants ............................................................................................ 53
Figure 35: Allen Curve by Department .............................................................................................. 54
Figure 36: Netgraph by Department................................................................................................... 55
Figure 37: Netgraph by Position ............................................................................................................ 55
Figure 38: Recommended Practical Vision of TechOps Organizational Structure ............................... 59
Figure 39: Recommended Implementation Plan................................................................................. 60
Figure 40: Visual Interpretation of Recommendation Interdependencies ............................................ 61
Figure 41: Communication Study Part 1 Survey Design..................................................................... 63
Figure 42: Communication Study Part 2 Survey Design..................................................................... 64
10
This page intentionally left blank.
11
I Chapter 1: Introduction
Today pharmaceuticals are manufactured using batch processing methods, and, as a result, typical
manufacturing departments of pharmaceutical companies are organized around these batch process steps,
focusing on building technical expertise and optimizing individual functions. Novartis Pharma Technical
Operations (TechOps) is no exception. TechOps operational functions have deep technical knowledge of
their respective processes (such as chemical production, cell culture, and galenic production, etc), and this
division of labor has worked to grow their business to where it is today. However, the pharmaceutical
industry is a complex industry facing significant changes and challenges we will continue to see for years
to come. For example, the FDA and regulatory bodies are imposing higher safety regulations, companies
are partnering with universities (like Novartis and MIT) to pioneer new manufacturing techniques, and
the biotech is growing more than ever before.
Supply issues in the pharmaceutical industry can range in severity from being short a single batch of drug
substance (DS) to delivery failures a life-saving drug. The problems can stem from any number of root
causes: backorders at a supplier, information discrepancies in the IT systems or incompatibility of a
production change with a given machine. At a global level, executives want to see customer services
levels meeting and exceeding their already high targets, which means controlling the enterprise effects of
supply issues. To do this, the pharmaceutical manufacturing and supply chain organizations need a clear
picture of what is happening end-to-end in their division.
For a functionally organized, global company, how can the organization change to reduce the costs of
complexity and create sustainable end-to-end visibility? The research this paper presents is a result of a
six-month engagement at Novartis Pharma global corporate headquarters in Basel, Switzerland from June
- Dec 2011, and aims to answer this question. The answer, we will see, comes from setting the right
incentives that encourage collaboration, communication and product ownership. The main focus of the
paper is a systems dynamics model that shows the high level relationship among organizational structure
of a global manufacturing group, processes, and communication and how these relationships can affect
production and supply issues and issue resolution. This model and supplementary studies are used to help
Novartis Pharma plan future organizational changes, and these techniques can be applied to a wide range
of companies and industries.
1.1 Thesis Motivation
As studied in depth by Stephen A. Wilson and Andrei Perumal in their book Waging War on Complexity
Costs: Reshape Your Cost Structure, Free Up Cash Flows and Boost Productivity by Attacking Process,
Product and Organizational Complexity (2010), truly global companies deal with a variety of complexity
issues that compound each other. Including:
* Organizational complexities as functional entities, number of resources, and systems grow and
diversify
* Process complexities from producing products in decentralized, world-wide manufacturing and
supply chains
e Product complexities as they cater to multi-cultural markets and growing customizations.
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The interaction of these complexities and the costs associated with them can have a great affect on the
health of an organization, especially one going through an industry transformation, like the
pharmaceutical industry is. Because of these changes, companies need better control over their
complexities in order to be flexible to these changing markets. Thus, to understand how strengthen
TechOps, we need to first understand how the business is organized today and where they want to be in
the future, investigate the effect of complexity and communication on the organization, and recognize
how these complexities will affect future changes.
Communication effectiveness - the ability to share information in a manner that is useful - is a key
component to the success of any organization. MIT Professor Thomas Allen proves that the physical
location of people within a research and development (R&D) group has a profound effect on
communication and innovation in his book Managing the Flow of Technology (1984). Using similar
techniques our research aims to understand how global manufacturing and supply chains organizations
are also affected by their physical locations, and how this ultimately plays a role in perpetuating supply
issues.
Additionally how information is used and shared within available IT systems is an important component
of effective communication. However, as studies were done on communication, and information flow, it
became apparent the sheer complexity of the organization and its processes also played a role in the
number of supply issues the company faces.
The motivation of this thesis is to understand if and how the communication and information flows are
affected by the global organizational structure and vice versa. Then we use this information to define a
method by which to organize the manufacturing and supply chain divisions for better informed decision
making by creating better visibility in the end-to-end processes of its major products.
1.1 Problem Statement
To study the dynamic relationships in a real-world setting we look at Novartis Pharma Technical
Operations. Novartis Pharma ("Pharma"). It is a perfect example of a global company with complex
supply chains and manufacturing processes dealing with low end-to-end visibility. TechOps is looking to
modify their global organization in such a way that give them a full picture of the health of the supply
chain without losing any of technical capabilities. However, it is difficult to understand exactly what to
change and how. In investigating a method of how to strengthen the Global TechOps organization that
fulfills their goal of being world class supply organization, disparities in communication become
apparent, and the undesirable side effects of organizational and process complexity surface.
What are the management implications of these adverse side effects? How can we change the
organization to combat these issues from a global level that fits with the strategy and culture of the
company? How can we find a good balance between brand ownership and functional expertise within the
TechOps organization?
1.2 Hypothesis and Approach
As we investigate the effect of complexity and communication on an organization, we turn to the field of
system dynamics to map the relationships of these factors to the issues companies see at a global level.
This paper will prove that the generic model of production and supply issues presented can be directly
applied to the situation at Novartis will help determine the best next steps for organizational
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improvement. The model requires the organization to be both organizationally and systematically
complex. Thus we will prove that Novartis's organization displays many of the characteristics of a
complex organization. We will first look at the current state of the organization and understand TechOps
future vision through its major initiatives. Then, through product case studies, we will show complexities
in the production processes. Through a communication study of the global operational organization, we
will show concretely the lack of cross-functional communication with the current organizational structure.
We can apply the model to see how compounding complexities of the organization and processed over
time can directly impact production and supply, justifying the need for global organizational
improvements.
This paper will recommend that in order to raise the end-to-end visibility and move toward an
organizational structure that is aligned with their future goals, TechOps will need to increase their
communication effectiveness, reduce its organizational and process complexities through better resource
and project management and build additional incentives into the roles and responsibilities into the global
team. Additionally, we see that making gradual changes to the organizational structure will help solve
short term problems caused by these complexities while planning for long term industry changes.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis topic. It over-views of thesis motivation, problem statement and
hypothesis and previews of the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 covers the major literature theoretical concepts written about organizational behavior,
organizational structure and their relationship with communication and information flow. It introduces
Systems Dynamics modeling, and how this can be used to demonstrate behaviors over time. It details the
background and definitions of Organizational and Process Complexity and their effects on the company.
It talks about the Allen curve and studies regarding physical space and communication frequency. These
three concepts will be brought together to show how decisions about the future organization will be make
at Novartis and how these techniques can be applied to other companies.
Chapter 3 explains the applicable the model and the necessary inputs. It shows what generally happens
with unaligned issue resolution systems and how fire-fighting propagates in a complex system.
Chapter 4 introduces the case study of Novartis and gives an overview of the pharmaceutical industry
and Novartis Pharma.
Chapter 5 delves deeper into the TechOps organization to show the major initiatives that are driving the
desire for organizational change.
Chapter 6 case studies two of Pharma's products. Product I is a small molecule drug with high growth
projections. Product 2 is a large molecule drug slated to go to market for multiple indications. Case
studying these drugs gives us insight in the vast process complexities TechOps is facing.
Chapter 7 explains the communications study conducted by the author over a 1 month period in October
2011 at global TechOps. Using techniques developed at the MIT International Institute of the
Management of Technology, we see from the short study the communication patterns and frequency
among the participants and can derive what factors play the largest role in communication effectiveness.
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The study not only further verifies how the dynamic model fits TechOps current situation; it also helps
shape the recommended next steps.
Chapter 8 shows how we use the study results and the model analysis to come to some consensus about
the changes needed in at Novartis, and how to use these results to create a program roadmap. It also gives
a detailed 3-lens analysis on what strategic, political, and cultural considerations need to be taken into
account on the final recommendation. It explains the larger applications of the model and major
conclusions. Additionally this chapter gives suggestions for follow-up studies and further research.
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2 Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter will give an overview of research conducted in organizational behavior, system dynamics,
complexity reduction, project management and business dynamics aided in the generation of the model
design. We will define organizational and process complexity and their interactions. We will look at
communication studies designed by the MIT International Institute of the Management of Technology
and use the distribution of communication probability among the departments also affects the severity of
production and supply issues.
2.1 System Dynamics Modeling
Systems Dynamics is the study of the behavior of complex systems over time. As explained by its
creator, Jay W. Forrester (Forrester, 1961) "[System dynamics] is an approach that should help in
important management problems... The goal should be to find management policies and organizational
structures that lead to greater success." (Sterman, 2000). We will be using system dynamics modeling to
help us determine the appropriate actions to take in the Novartis case study.
Dynamic models are represented by causal loop and stock and flow diagrams. The causal loops show the
feedback relationship of the variables in the system. Stocks and flows "characterize the state of the
system" (Sterman, 2000). The stocks are accumulations in the system, and flows are the rate of either
built up (inflow) or reduction of stock (outflow). Mathematically, stocks are integral of the difference
between the inflow and the outflow plus the initial value of the stock.
We will use research of Jay W. Forrester, John Sterman and Nelson Repenning to make some
assumptions in our model. In particular, we will assume that the production change dynamics behave in a
similar way product development dynamics when it comes to fire fighting as presented in the paper
"Understanding fire fighting in new product development" by Nelson Repenning; illustrated in Figure 1
below. (Repenning, 2001)
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Figure 1: Fire-Fighting Dynamic Diagram
We will also use similar relationships among suppliers, manufacturers and distributors as described in
Business Dynamics models (Sterman, 2000)
2.2 Organizational Design
Organizational Structure is the arrangement of authority, communication and financials within an
organization. In a research paper presented at the International Requirements Engineering Conference in
2011 "The organizational structure is meant to determine not only the division of labor and modes of
operation to achieve a work outcome but also the ways in which information between organizational roles
should flow" (Marczak & Damian, 2011).
Organizational Design is the management of the interaction of the elements of the organizational
structure, and has been studied extensively by Professor Jay R. Galbraith of the European Institute for
Advanced Studies. To help build the model, we took into Galbraith's information processing view of
organizational design. Galbraith claims organizations are designed around information needs and
uncertainties in the task they need to perform. There are 5 strategies by which they organize themselves
(see Figure 2). Organizations either reduce the need of information processing through 1. Additional
resource management and 2.Creating output oriented groups. In the case of TechOps, this would be a
focus on product line, rather than operational functions. Additionally, organizations increase their
capacity to process information by 3.implementing vertical information systems with standard language
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and formalized decision-making language and 4.by creating lateral relationships. In other words, they
"create joint decision processes which cut across lines of authority" and moves decision making authority
down the hierarchy. Galbraith points out that while lateral relationships tend to happen spontaneously,
multi-national companies must design it into the organization through integrating roles, managerial
linking, liaisons, task forces, and direct contact (p. 33). The final strategy is to reduce the overall
uncertainty in the organizations environment (rather than react to uncertainty) (Galbraith, 1974). By
looking at organization and process complexities presented in the Section 2.3 and interpreting the output
of the model, we can find the optimal combination of these strategies for TechOps.
Framework of Org Design
1. Rules & Programus
2. Hierachical Reference
3. Goal Setting
Figure 2: Organizational Design Strategies
Adapted from Figure 1, pg 30 (Galbraith, 1974)
2.3 Defining Complexity and the Organizational/Process Complexity Face
Complexity in business processes has been defined many literature and academic articles give a fairly
comprehensive list of definitions of systems complexity and consolidate the definition into two
components: detailed and dynamic complexity (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn, & Flynn, 2009). The
definitions of detailed and dynamic complexity are supported by Sterman (Sterman, 2000). Detail
complexity is " the distinct number of components or parts that make up a system", and dynamic
complexity as "the unpredictability of a system's response to a given set of inputs, driven in part by the
interconnectedness of the many parts that make up the system." Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn, & Flynn (2009)
in their thesis and supplementary literature prove that complexity in the supply chain leads to higher
manufacturing costs and impacts scheduling optimization. Additional they show the adverse impact of
complexity on customer service and plant competitive performance. We will use these assumptions and
similar techniques to infer the process complexity effect included in the systems dynamics model.
In their book Waging War on Complexity Costs(2010), Wilson & Perumal talk about three types of
business complexities that effect the productivity, cash flows and cost structure: Product, Process and
Organizational complexity. Figures 3 and 4 show how these dimensions interact with each other.
Essentially what these figures represent is the geometric relationship between their complexities. Thus
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explaining that looking at process changes without understanding how they affect the organization will be
ineffective. As we will see in the Novartis example, not all complexity dimensions are taken into account
when making decisions. For example, while there was a large effort to reduce inventory, production and
customer processes were not updated in such a way that accounted for the lower inventory values.
However, by becoming aware of the adverse effects of these complexities, companies can not only gain
competitive advantages, they can make their processes and product sustainable and flexible to future
changes.
Organization
Figure 3: Complexity Cube
(Wilson & Penunal, 2010) Figure 3
Non~vaka4i
"Vp
Figure 4: Complexity Cube VA & NVA
(Wilson & Pemmal, 2010) Figure 4
This paper will use focus on the Organizational/Process complexity face. We will look at the interactions
of the many departments and process within TechOps, and try to understand how to make changes that
will reduce the impact of these complexities in the long term.
Looking specifically at organizational complexity in literature, we come across several definitions. The
International Encyclopedia of Business and Management (Dooley, 2002), defines organizational
complexity as "the amount of differentiation that exists within different elements constituting the
organization." They then breakdown this definition into: amount of professional specialization (i.e.
number of different roles needed) and level of qualifications and the amount of variety in the core
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processes and technologies. In the pharmaceutical industry, we see a high level of specialization,
qualification and variety: there are many different roles needed to produce and sell products from
scientists and lab technicians to regulatory liaisons to finance and strategy professionals. Even
manufacturing floor operators require higher education degrees and extensive training, and operations in
multiple countries, multiple suppliers, brands, and customers. Ultimately, organizational complexity is a
function of the processes of the company and the products provided. Thus, as defined by Wilson &
Perumal (2010), "organizational complexity is the number of facilities, assets, functional entities,
organizationally units, systems, etc. involved in executing the processes of a company." We can look at
organizational complexity and process complexity separately as examples of detailed complexity and
their interaction on the Organizational/Process Face as the dynamic component.
The literature emphasizes that companies need to focus on reducing is not just complexity itself, but the
undesirable impact of that complexity (such as increased costs). Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn, and Flynn
(2009) also explain that the goal in not to eliminate all complexities in the system, but to "understand the
potential performance impacts of these choices, and, where necessary, take actions to offset or
accommodate the higher levels of complexity that strategic imperatives might entail." This paper will
only be looking at the supply and production issues from a higher level (not detailed perspective), as
Wilson & Perumal suggest to do.
As the nature of the pharmaceutical industry has an unwavering amount of process complexity built in
when taking account development and manufacturing regulations, and varying country sales
requirements. While complexities can lead to some competitive advantages, mismanaging these
complexities will create a rigid compartmentalized organization, which can eventually lead to diminishing
profits. For the both the organization and process face, it proves very difficult of assign a specific dollar-
value to each component of complexity, therefore we want to break the work down into value-add or non-
value add components. We then look for a way to reduce the non-value added tasks and the costs of the
non-value added tasks.
Organization Process
Complexity Complexity
Structures stretch to meet Reduced visibily
t work of the firm end-tc4nd
Figure 5: Organization-Process Complexity Relationship
(Wilson & Perumal, 2010) Figure 10
Delving deeper in the interactions between organizational and process complexities, Wilson & Permumal
suggest that several patterns immerge as a result of their relationship:
1. Exceptions become the rule
2. Linkages across the company become masked
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3. Long project lead times with low resource productivity
In dealing with #1, we will also take into account studies done by Repenning (2001) on the phenomena of
"fire fighting" (assigning limited resources to solve unanticipated, urgent problems; we will refer to the
team of people assigned to this "fight fires" as a "Tiger Teams" which is the common language at
Novartis). Repenning shows that not only is fire-fighting self reinforcing, but that complex product
development systems (ones with multiple parallel projects and product launches) are particularly
susceptible to this dynamic. In our model, we apply this same dynamic to the product change request
(CR) process. We will use the Wilson & Permumal research to make assumptions on the mathematical
relationships between change and issue resolution lead times, and effect of deteriorating end-to-end links.
We also use the results of the communications study to show the lack of end-to-end communication,
which is discussed in the next section.
2.4 Communication Studies
A major aspect to the interaction of organization and process is communication. One way to specifically
measure how the departments are linked to each other within a company is to study communication
patterns across departments and physical distances between resources. Professor Thomas J. Allen, the
Howard W. Johnson Professor of the MIT Sloan School of Management, has conducted many studies
with engineers and researchers though MIT's International Institute of the Management of Technology.
In Prof. Allen's first book, Managing the Flow of Technology (1984), he proved that the frequency of
communication among engineers and researchers drops exponentially as the distance between them
increases (called the Allen curve after its discoverer). In addition, Professor Allen expended his study to
look at how pairs of engineers interact if they are working on similar projects or report to the same
department, and discovered that while there is a slight uplift in frequency of communication, the general
shape stays the same for resources sharing department and projects (See Figure 5)
P bability of communication vs. DistanceP(C
Palm Slirntn a Depatme
D - f(1N) DISTANCE
P = f(Iss)
Figure 6: Allen Curve
(Allen, 1997)Figure 8
What does the curve look like in an operational organization, where meeting schedules, production plans
and business tasks drive the daily communication, not innovations? One of the hypotheses of this thesis
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is that it would look very similar to the Allen curve. However, what we found was that based on
incentives and roles and responsibilities of the global TechOps resources the department has a greater
impact on the frequency of communication than distance. Additionally, if we look into the compounding
complexities of the Organization/Process face and build the communication pattern information flow into
a dynamic model, we see the direct impact of these variables on how quickly a company can resolve
production issues and supply issues. And we see this happening in TechOps.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we discussed assumptions brought together by the research that will be included in the
systems dynamics model. We then reviewed the literature of organizational structure and design theory,
and defined dynamic and detail complexity, organizational complexity, and process complexity. We
talked about communication and the Allen curve, and how similar techniques will be used to gather
information on the communication patterns of the Novartis Pharma global operations group. In the
following chapters we will explore application of these theories in the case study of Novartis Pharma
Technical Operations.
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3 Chapter 3: Systems Dynamics Modeling
This chapter will explain the generic model created from theory and research. The model will show the
dynamics between production changes, production issues, supply issue build-up, which ultimately affects
customer service levels. This chapter will explain the base model, the stocks, flow, and auxiliary
variables that make up the model. It then adds the effect of organizational and process complexity and
communication factors. The goal of the model is to communicate the proliferation of Tiger Teams and
thus the need for organizational change to executives, and can be adapted to many companies and
industries. In later chapters we case study Novartis as an example of how the model can be applied in the
real world. Because this model was developed for global teams, the "production issues" and "supply
issues" we discuss are in a very generic sense of the term. The issues encountered vary greatly in
severity, cost, and fundamental root cause. However, what the dynamic model does show there is a
positive outcome of reducing organizational and process complexity and facilitating effective
communication.
3.1 Base Model - Production and Supply Issues
The initial model (Figure 7) shows how the productions changes beget production issues, production
issues turn into supply issues, and supply issues can affect customer service levels. Given the nature of
the pharmaceutical industry and the Novartis change process, time is measured in months.
Product Launcs Prodttin Launch Coupted
+ Completin Rate
Figure 7: Issue Dynamics - Base Model
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3.1.1 Product Launches
In the model, resources are assigned to production launches. New product launches can be brand new
products with first time introductions to the market or (in many of Novartis's cases) the launching of new
SKUs or variation within an existing product family. The stock of Product Launches Remaining is
drained by the flow of Product Launch Completion Rate. When those tasks are completed, they
accumulate in the stock of Product Launched Completed. However, there is some probability, PI, that the
production change was not compatible with other processes, and thus causes downstream or upstream
production issues. Additionally, not all suggested changes are implemented by the go-live date, and thus
turn into change requests (CRs) slated to be implemented after launch.
Product Launches Production Launch Conpleted
Rerminng Production Launch
+ Completion Rate
Average time to
Resouces Working on complete Production R
Product Launches Change
Fraction of Changes
From Launch
Figure 8: Product Launches
3.1.2 Production Issues
Production Changes include planned production change-overs and official change requests. Planned
change-overs occur in multiproduct and multi SKU production lines. Since TechOps is manufacturing
12,000+ SKUs, changeovers happen quite frequently. As we will see in detail in the product case studies
in Chapter 6, even BPO plants which have much lower volume and number of products than ChemOps
and PharmOps plants, have several change-overs per year. Production change requests (CRs) can come
from a variety of sources. They can be technology issues that were not implemented before the launch of
the product, preventative upgrades to equipment, or process changes that only affect the non-
manufacturing steps as part of a Lean transformation. All production change requests in TechOps are
inputted into an information system and reviewed by a cross-functional governing body. Despite the
governing board, ownership of the change request system itself and the changes in general is not
consistent across sites, and how a change will affect either an upstream or downstream process is rarely
known due to complexities in the system. Therefore, we see fallout of production changes that cause
production issues. We will see how the risk of organizational complexity applies to Novartis in Section
5.2. The CRs in the model are assumed to be approved already.
In this part of the model (Figure 9) shows after a time delay, there is probability of P, that requirements
were not implemented before the product launch, and therefore production changes are needed after the
fact; these take the form of CRs. Production changes that are not completed in a timely manner will cause
production issues, which, in turn require additional resources. The outset of the model simulation, all
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production issues reside in the stock of Production Issues Remaining. As resources are applied resolve
issues, the tasks are executed and then accumulate in the stock of Production Solutions Awaiting Sign-off.
As they are reviewed and approved by the stakeholders, they flow to the stock of Production Issue
Solutions. The solution may in fact require an additional production change, accumulating in the stock
Production Changes. QA and, testing is incorporated into the model as an "uncapacitated delay",
meaning it takes time, but consumes no additional resources (Repenning, 2001).
Resource Working on
Production Changes
Production Changes
Resources working on SolutionsProduciton Issues Solutions Cause
B 
C ange
Production Issues Prod Issue Resolutions Awaitin Production Issue
Rennning Issue Resolution sign-off Rate of S"olutionsSouin
Rate Passing Testing
Fraction of Issues that
Cause Supply Issues
Figure 9: Production Issues Base Model
As change-overs happen more frequently, the system is prone to errors as planning and scheduling
become more complicated.. CRs are proactive measures to prevent production issues; however the high
priority changes usually result from a process that was not implemented before product launch.
Production changes go through a rigorous approval and testing process, but there can be fall out of
additional issues for several reasons that all loop back to complexity causes or lack of proper information
and communication; including:
* Unexpected consequences
* Preventative measure was not prioritized properly
* Changes not communicated effectively to downstream parties
* Lack the sophistication in proactive tracking to see that the change may cause an issue before it is
too late
Section 3.2 shows when production process becomes more complicated and complex, and change
approval more decentralized, the P, grows.
3.1.3 Supply Issues
Supply issues refer to inventory levels beginning lower than the designated safety stock amount. Supply
issues can be caused by growing production issues, late order changes, or simply by the inventory
management systems not being up to date. Supply issues will cause customer service issues if the
inventory is so low that orders cannot be delivered on time and in full. Novartis, like most
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pharmaceutical companies strive to maintain high (above 99%) customer service level (CSL). Recently,
the CSL for some non-life saving drugs dropped to well below Novartis standards.
The model (Figure 10) is very similar to the Production Issue portion presented in the previous section.
There is probability of Ps that a production issue will cause a supply issue if it goes untreated or
uncommunicatied. There are also supply issues that are not caused directly by production issues but are
internal to the complexities of the supply chain process. Thus from the outset of the simulation, supply
issues reside in the stock of Supply Issues Remaining. As resources are applied to resolve issues, the tasks
are executed and then accumulate in the stock of Supply Issues Awaiting Sign-off. As they are reviewed
by the stakeholders, they flow to the stock of Supply Issue Solutions.
Resorcesn
Supply Issues FractiDn of Issues that
R Cause Supply Issues
Supply Issues
RatSupply SoftionsReworked Supply Soktio
Failing
+ XE Supply Issue
supply issue Renmining Supply Issu Resokwins Awaitng Testn Sokaions
Supply Issue Rate of Resokbions
Resohion Rate Passing Testing
Figure 10: Supply Issues Base Case
3.2 Assumptions
As this model is adapted from Repenning's (2001) production development model, the assumptions
behind the model are similar. Firstly, we assume that if additional time and effort are spent on the upfront
product launch, in particular in process development, there would be fewer change requests needed after
launch. As the knowledge of both the technology and the end-to-end system increases, then production
projects are better designed. Research shows that when resources have adequate time to spend on project
work, not only can they complete more projects during the year (Wilson & Perumal, 2010) but they also
help reduce the uncertainty in the outcome of the project (Galbraith, 1974). Likewise, if additional time is
spent fixing production issues and these issues are effectively communicated to the integrated parties,
there would be fewer supply issues downstream. Second we assume that production issue resolution will
take priority over product changes and product launch design, and supply issue resolution will take
priority over production issues resolution. As supply issues may affect customer service levels, they will
take precedence in resource assignments. Lastly, we assume that product launches are in fixed,
overlapping intervals. This is rule in the pharmaceutical industry with new product launches and capital
projects. We also see this behavior in other industries as well, such as the automobile industry
(Repenning, 2001).
Additionally, this model is looking at the internal uncertainties of information flow, and the companies'
reaction. There are additional external factors that can cause production and supply issues (in the
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pharmaceutical industry, this could be a shutdown by the FDA or issues with the 3rd party logistics
provider (3PL) shipping goods). These are not modeled in the base case.
3.3 Implications of the Base Model
The model represents a phenomenon seen in many companies at different levels and different departments
call "fire-fighting" which causes the formation of "Tiger Teams." Tiger Teams are created to fix urgent
issues in the system, pulling resource away from daily tasks. In a normal year, resources will work on
both product launches and issue resolution. With resources allocated correctly and the right amount of
project management, even with some issues occurring the system will remain relatively stable and will be
able to recover. However, if shocks are introduced to the system, such as products using new
manufacturing techniques, it can be very difficult for this non-linear system to recover. In other words, if
the system starts out with low productivity, it will launch into a negative reinforcing loop, making the
Tiger Team state the steady state of the system (Repenning, 2001). Assigning resources to solve issues
outside of their organizational position creates a classic dynamic phenomenon where things get better
before they get worse. Specifically, the project improves, but eventually the system as a whole degrades
since there are a finite number of resources. The delays in the system (between launch and CR, and
production issues and supply issues) and lack of connection among resources, make it difficult to link
these consequences. Additionally, we see as resource utilization increases, the time per task increases
because resources are spread too thin (see Figure 11). This ends up perpetuating the Tiger Team
phenomenon further.
(Wlo20ema,21) iue6
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Figure 11: Total Time Consumed per Task
(Wilson & Perumal, 2010) Figure 60
3.4 Adding in Organizational Complexity, Process Complexity and
Communication factors
Although it is hard to truly quantify the total costs of the Organization/Process complexity face,
conceptually we can see how it affects the dynamics of the process and supply issue system (see Figure
12).
As Organizational Complexity increases, the number of issues Solutions Causes Change increase,
because the production issues are more integrated to multiple departments. Likewise more
Organizational Complexity will cause Supply Issue Failing sign-off to increase for the same reason.
When companies have complex organizations, issues tend effect multiple groups, even though visibility
of these interdependencies are not always clear. Thus the amount of Resources working on Production
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Issues will increase and Communication Effectiveness will decrease. As Process Complexity increases, the
Fraction of Changesfrom Launch will increase because the product launch window is finite and
companies have to prioritize the features of the product and production process. Lower priority features
are implemented after launch. Additionally, with Production Issues, if Process Complexity is high, the
number of resources required to solve issues will increase further draining the system of resources. As
issues flow downstream through the supply chain, complexity creates additional constraints. Process
Complexity will decrease Supply Issue Resolution Rates.
However, by decreasing the impact of complexities we can increase communication effectiveness and
vice versa. This, in turn, prevents production issues from turning into supply issues because the value
stream is better prepared and able to make contingency plans. Thus, supply issue resolution rates will also
increase. If we look at these additions to Galbraith's information processing view (1974), this concept is
the organization dealing with uncertainty.
hottmwu Podatf, Laug
Resouces Worki on C
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FromLaunch
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Figure 12: Model with Complexity and Communication Factors
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented the generic model of production and supply issue build up in a complex
organization. The model uses the assumption that organizational and process complexity create a
negative reinforcing loop with each other (Wilson & Perumal, 2010), which then diminishes the positive
effect of communication. In subsequent Chapters we will prove that this model is a fit to Novartis
Pharma TechOps and can be used to make decisions on organizational changes.
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4 Chapter 4: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Novartis Pharma
Organizational Process theory tell us that structural change is needed when either the business
environment has changed, making present structure ineffective and/or current linking and alignment
mechanisms lead to under-performance (Mortensen, 2010). TechOps in not currently in a position where
the organization structure is completely obsolete, but with continuous changes in the industry and in
manufacturing techniques, they are making a pro-active change so they will be ready for the future. This
chapter details the trends in the industry and the background of Novartis relevant to the organization
change.
4.1 The Pharmaceutical Industry Background - Related Trends and Challenges
The Pharmaceutical Industry has been facing significant changes and challenges over the past decade, and
will continue to see these trends for years to come. These include:
1. Increasing stringency of the regulatory bodies: The FDA now requires that a drug not only work
as specified on the given indication, but must also be safer and more effective than any other drug
on the market for that indication. And just recently (July 2011), they published a regulation
establishing a new safety-reporting standard for clinical trials. (www.fda.gov, 2011)
2. Increase in global competition: Growth of pharmaceutical manufacturing and research in
countries and government manufacturing requirements for local sales.
3. Patent expiration of blockbuster drugs: 2010's top selling drugs (Pfizer's Lipitor and Sanofi-
Aventis' Plavix) will be coming off patent in the next two years.
4. Diminishing levels of new drug approvals: According to a study done by BIO' Phase 3 approval
rate from 2006-2010 was 80%, down from 93% in previous years. There has been speculation
that this is a corollary to #1 and #3 above. The theory is that most of the small molecule drugs
targeting ailments that affect large populations have already been discovered, patented, and/or are
already being commercially produced.
Although there is counter evidence to #4, (FDA reports show that 2011 approvals will meet or exceed
2010 levels), the trends produced two major shifts in the industry:
1.) Research and development (R&D) of lower volume, orphan classed indications and biotech (large
molecule) products. Orphan drug approvals nearly doubled from 1997-2010 compared to 1983-1996.
FDA approval success rate from 2006-20 10 was 15% for biologics versus 7% for small-molecule drugs
(BIO).
2.) The value creation of products is no longer in the early phases of clinical trials, but rather in the later
stages and the ability to scale-up and manufacture a continuous, uninterrupted supply. The main cause of
BIO is the world's largest biotechnology organization, providing advocacy, business development and communications services
for more than 1,100 members worldwide. The mission of BIG is to be the champion of biotechnology and the advocate for its
member organizations - both large and small. (www.bio.org)
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the stricter regulation mentioned above is safety. Therefore, manufacturing innovations and techniques
such as quality by design and design for manufacturing will prove very valuable to the future of the
pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, once products are commercialized, the security of the supply
chain is extremely important to the safety and efficacy of drugs. Thus techniques and steps in the
manufacturing and supply chain process that impede counterfeiting are also very valuable.
To combat these challenges and face these new trends to the benefit of the company and industry,
Novartis is building up their biotech capabilities and well as focusing on process improvements and
innovations in manufacturing. New techniques of manufacturing will, in turn, cause changes to the global
operations as a whole, as they adapt to the changing trends and processes.
4.2 Background of Novartis Pharma
Novartis AG was created in 1996 through the merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, and currently is
composed of six commercial divisions: Pharmaceuticals (prescription drugs), Sandoz (generics), Vaccines
and Diagnostics (V&D), OTC (over-the-counter consumer products), Alcon (vision, acquired in 2011),
and Animal Health.
The Novartis Pharmaceuticals (Pharma) is the largest of six divisions of Novartis AG (see Figure 13) is
responsible for 60 key marketed products and, in 2010, acquired 13 major regulatory approvals United
States, Europe and Japan. Pharma has sales and operations in over 80 countries, and achieved net sales of
$30.6 billion USD in 2010, 60% of total Novartis sales.
Figure 13: Novartis Pharma Organizational Structure
Within Pharma, Technical Operations (TechOps) is responsible for all commercial product
manufacturing, distribution, fulfillment, and facilities management. They are also responsible for aspects
of new product launches and Phase 3 clinical production TechOps manufactures over 12,000 SKUs for
millions of patients worldwide.
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Globally, TechOps is organized into corporate support functions (including Finance, HR, QA, Legal, etc.)
and three distinct operational functions:
1. Chemical Operations (ChemOps), responsible for manufacturing small molecule APIs
2. Biopharmaceutical Operations (BPO), responsible for manufacturing large molecule drug
substance and some preliminary packaging
3. Pharmaceutical Operations (PharmOps), responsible for manufacturing drug product, fill & finish
and final packaging.
nd
A chemops fl Biofharmops
Figure 14: TechOps Global Network
Additionally, TechOps is expanding their External Supply operations. This group manages relationships
with third party manufacturers of Novartis's patented products.
Almost all manufacturing sites are dedicated to a single operational function, and therefore operate
autonomously from each other. This along with the global operational organizational structure has posed
some challenges to the future goals of the business that will be discussed in subsequent sections.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the pharmaceutical industry and Novartis AG. We gave an overview of the
Pharma organization and the TechOps division. With the complexities and uncertainties of information in
the industry, TechOps is a great candidate to compare its operations to the dynamic model presented in
Chapter 3.
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5 Chapter 5: Understanding Organizational Complexity through Current
State Analysis of TechOps Organizational Structure
In order prove that TechOps is a good fit to the model, we first look at the current state of the
organization. The objective of the current-state analysis is to understand how TechOps is organized
today. Specifically: What does the organizational structure look like? What are the communication
patterns among the global groups? How does information flow through the system, where are the biggest
pain points and bottlenecks in information? How does this organizational structure fit with the future
goals of the business? We will also use Wilson & Perumal's Process/Organization complexity checklist
to show that TechOps is justified in trying to tackle the complexities in their system through
organizational redesign (2010).
5.1 TechOps Organizational structure
TechOps is organized in a matrix-type structure where each of the three distinct operations has corporate
functions servicing them. These departments, such as Finance, Strategy, Human Resources (HR), and
Information Technology (IT) have fairly standard roles, with reporting lines to both the operational head
and functional heads. The Innovation, Quality, Productivity (IQP) group, which serves and Novartis
Pharma's internal Lean manufacturing consultants has both a global and operational role. The only truly
"cross-functional" group is the global Pharma Supply Chain Management (PSC), who is responsible for
all non-manufacturing steps in the production process, including inventory, logistics, and transportation.
- U
Figure 15: Current TechOps Organizational Structure
Unlike other TechOps divisions, PSC is organized very similar to the rest of the Pharma organization by
business units (or franchises) responsible for product categories and product lines, and regional units
responsible for order delivery to the country pharmaceutical organizations (CPOs)
Each dedicated manufacturing site reports into the global Operations head. Budgets, financial planning,
information systems and metrics are set up along the operational reporting lines and geographies because
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sites are dedicated to an operation. Through interviews and observations we learn that these operational
divisions do not allow for globally optimal production schedules for products and are not in line with the
future manufacturing plans of Novartis Pharma.
Each manufacturing site contains several process units (PUs). There are three levels of hierarchy within a
process unit and the PU Heads report to the site head. Because each Novartis site is dedicated to a
specific operation, Site Heads then report to the respective global operational head, who then reports to
the head of TechOps. With only 6 layers between floor operators and the head of Global TechOps,
Novartis is a fairly flat organization compared with other life-science companies we studied.
5.2 Initiating the Need for Change: TechOps Strategic Vision and Key Initiatives
The 2015 vision for TechOps is to become a world class, patient driven, supply network. This was
updated from the 2010 vision of being a world class manufacturing organization.
Figure 16: TecbOps Vision Transition
In order to support the 2015 vision Global TechOps needs an organizational structure that will allow it to
be responsive and flexible to the future product portfolio of Novartis and the Life Sciences industry as a
whole which includes lower volume products, introducing continuous manufacturing techniques and
higher demand variability.
TechOps has specific goals for each pillar in the new vision and has created global initiatives to meet
these goals:
" Integrated Business Planning - creating global strategies and operational processes, and new
product launch processes that involve cross-functional teams to increase flexibility
* Market Demand Focus - Understanding the customer needs and TechOps current limits to
delivering, enhancing demand networks to smooth forecasting
* Value Creation - value based procurement, network optimization, working capital optimization
34
Integrated
Busiin:ess Planning
M 't
Aarket Demand
FOCUS
u e Creation
#1
I lexil.)1e
( 7n,Cost I if ("'Ctive
* Leading Manufacturing Technologies - quality beyond compliance, innovative technologies such
and continuous manufacturing
* Building Capabilities - Improving change management and talent development
Three initiatives in particular demonstrate the direction in which Novartis is headed, and will help show
the needs for organizational change at the global level.
5.2.1 Process Oriented Organization (POO)
To reach the goals of the 2010 vision, a large initiative took place last over the past several years called
Process Oriented Organization (POO), in which each manufacturing and packaging site redesigned its
organization structure from focusing on a functional hierarchy to focusing on the production process as a
whole. This initiative put in place new leadership roles (Process Units Heads) and new cross-functional,
self-directed teams (Process Units) at each site. The goal of POO is to empower the workforce to make
decisions, eliminate unnecessary hierarchies that lead to bureaucracy, and create transparency and
visibility across processes.
Traditional Process-Oriented Organisation
Figure 17: POO (Novartis Pharma, TechOps copyright 2009)
This structure works well locally, but the does not consistently roll up to the global organization. Each
site remains somewhat isolated among the processes for which they are responsible, and there is little
visibility on how certain actions will affects upstream and downstream tasks in the long run. Additionally
due to the vast differences in size, product lines, and facility design, there is a sentiment that cross-site
knowledge transfer is of little value and thus rarely happens outside of the IQP group. There are only a
few key roles that are responsible for cross-functional communication. These resources become
overworked and spread very thin because they are dealing with a variety of issues, many of which are
outside their official roles and responsibilities. We begin to see from these observations that the model is
a good fit for TechOps.
35
5.2.2 Complexity Reduction and Brand Rationalization Initiative
Novartis Pharma produces tens of thousands of SKUs. Many of which are the same product, but different
dosage forms and package sizes, each of which requires additional manufacturing planning and
production change-overs, which add to TechOps costs. The Complexity Reduction Initiative is looking
specifically at reducing product complexity by eliminating non-profitable and redundant SKUs. They
have added the element of Brand Rationalization which is a process to identify the current customer needs
at a local level and to streamline the product offering based off of those needs. The idea is to give the
marketing and sales force teams accountability for the profitability (not just the revenue generation) of the
SKUs they sell. Please refer to Kevin Leiter's and David Hilliard's LGO theses for more details on the
Product Complexity Reduction and Brand Rationalization Initiative and the outcomes from their research.
The existence and visibility of this initiative shows that Novartis has a lot of waste in it systems.
Complexity grows in the product/process face, but it hides in the organization/process face (Wilson &
Perumal, 2010) (Wilson & Perumal, 2010) (Wilson & Perumal, 2010). This paper explores what
additional complexities are causing less than optimal operations in TechOps and how the organization can
change in a productive way to combat these issues.
5.2.3 Continuous Manufacturing
The third initiative, Continuous Manufacturing, clearly shows the future need for more streamlined global
organization. The pains of traditional pharmaceutical manufacturing are stated on the home page of the
MIT School of Engineering Novartis-MIT Center for Continuous Manufacturing (Trout, 2012):
The batch-based manufacturing system currently employed by the
pharmaceutical industry is costly and inefficient. A drug's active
ingredients are synthesized in a chemical manufacturing plant and then
shipped to a separate facility where they are converted into large batches
of pills, liquids, or creams. With multiple interruptions, including
transport to separate locations, the production of just one batch of drugs
can take weeks. What's more, the manufacturing design and scale-up
required to produce a new drug can be financially unsustainable and
exceedingly time-consuming.
The idea of continuous manufacturing is to eliminate the costly and risky batch processing of today's drug
manufacturing and create a product that can be produced in an unbroken flow (See Figure 18). Not only
will this dramatically reduce the risks of contamination, because the APIs are not being moved from
facility to facility, but it will also decrease the time and cost of setting up a new facility, as the footprint of
a continuous manufacturing plant is much smaller than the traditional chemical and pharmaceutical
facilities. Additionally and important to our study, continuous manufacturing also eliminate a lot of non-
value added steps from changeovers and transportation.
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Novartis-MIT Blue Sky Vision
Continuous Manufacturing: A radical transformation
.. fthe Ultra LEAN Manufacturing
Figure 18: Continuous Manufacturing Diagram
(Novartis Copyright 2011)
Novartis has been working closely with MIT to develop this technology over the past 10-years, and there
are plans to move the prototype facility on to the Novartis campus in the next few years.
5.3 Diagnosing Organizational Complexity
What is missing in the execution of Vision 2015 is a true understanding of how the different units within
TechOps currently interact with each other and where the gaps are from the vision. As the company
moves towards continuous manufacturing techniques the misalignment with the organizational structure
will create additional complexities that will have further impact on the organization as a whole, possibly
sending TechOps into the undesirable downward spiral demonstrated by the dynamic model in Chapter
3.The current manufacturing facilities and operational departments are a result of the batch production
processes that are currently in place. But how does Novartis move towards a global organizational
structure that will be conducive to continuous manufacturing without disrupting the current products?
How are these initiatives integrated? How is the information passed among the teams? How does it
affect day-to-day activities? By looking at the three key initiatives in Novartis TechOps, we can begin to
understand how information and communication flows through global TechOps will play a key role in
creating an organization with common goals. Additionally, while the Complexity Redaction project is
looking at the Product/Process face of complexity costs, we will show why there is a need of also tackling
the Organization/Process face as well. As we saw from Figures 3 & 4 in Chapter 2, they are all
interdependent. If we look at the model and compare the current state, we see how it is applicable to
TechOps. Figure 19: Application of Model demonstrates as such:
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Figure 19: Application of Model
5.4 Application of the Model with TechOps Organizational Complexity
Wilson & Perumal claim that a company can reduce their operating costs through Organizational/Process
complexity reduction if the following symptoms listed below are present. Based on interviews, and
analysis of the 2011 employee survey,we see that TechOps can check almost all of the boxes below.
Table 1: Org/Process Complexity Symptoms
Symptom Example at Novartis
No clear end-to end visibility; no one Through interviews and observations of project management, it
has a clear picture of what everyone became very apparent the lack of end to end visibility.
does Communication study results in Chapter 7 will show the low
levels of cross-functional communication.
Information moves slowly through Communication study results. Employee survey results
multiple layers and silos in specifically state that employee believe the information they
organization need to do their jobs in not readily available.
Difficulty understanding trade-offs at At quarter end, inventory is pushed from operations into PSC
cross-functional boundaries which create a false sense of accomplishment for one group
Little outcome from a lot of activity Many projects happening simultaneously with similar goals, not
(e.g. accountability is blurred, way of tracking outcome, lessons learned, whether or not the
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Symptom Example at Novartis
decision rights unclear, more objectives were met
resources needed that initially
planned)
Diminished customer service levels Customer Service Levels are the lowest they have been in years
for several products
Complex uses of IT systems weighs Example of use of multiple systems, difficulty in accessing
down processes and decision making information, no manual or formal training, no incentive to use
rather than streamlining them the various software programs. No standards from site to site in
software except SAP, however there are also multiple instances
of SAP
(Wilson & Perumal, 2010, p. Ch. 7)
Additionally, although, leadership is very aware that there are functional divisions that focus on
technologies and not brand,, lack of communication and poor end-to-end visibility, it is also difficult to
change a large, complex system overnight, thus we need to look at root causes and attack the complexity
from within the organization. For example, PSC which sits between ChemOps and PharmOps
organizationally has no ownership over the actual production planning and forecasting; the usual points of
contention among the groups. Figure 19 illustrates how the model fits with Novartis TechOps. From the
model fit we will recommend methods to incentivize the groups to work together on a regular basis, not
just when there is a crisis, and a Tiger Team is needed. Otherwise, as the model shows, TechOps could
fall into the negative loop from which it may be unable to recover.
5.5 Summary
This chapter details the trends in the industry and the background of Novartis relevant to the
organizational change. We talked about how the pharmaceutical industry is changing through increasing
regulatory restrictions and the target indications. We then detailed Novartis and TechOps' current state
organization structure and key initiatives that affect communication and organizational and process
complexity including POO, Product Complexity Reduction and Continuous Manufacturing. Examples
prove Novartis behaves like the model, and reduce the impact of its Organizational complexity can yield
positive results.
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6 Chapter 6: Understanding Process Complexity through Physical Product
Flow, Information Flow and Value Stream Mapping
In this chapter we will delve deeper into the process complexity face by looking at 2 product production
processes. The goal of the case studies is to the further understand how the model fits with TechOps and
to find out where the gaps are between process and organizational structure, thus helping us design a
better future organization.
One of the biggest factors of process complexity at Novartis is the vast differences among the production
processes for various products. The batch processing within each operational function and manufacturing
site has allowed for shared process steps, allowing the POO to work well at a local level. However, as we
look at the branded production processes from a global level, production process are very different, and
need to be treated as such. In order to create a concrete example of the Organization/Process face and the
communication gaps between them, we look at the global TechOps and case study two products that
represent the breadth of TechOps manufacturing. We compare the communication frequency,
information flow for each product, and examine the differences and similarities of organizational behavior
among these groups.
Figure 20 illustrates the generic order management process at Novartis Pharma from the virtual order
flow from CPO to PSC to Manufacturing to the physical product flow from DS to DP to FP
manufacturing through PSC for customer distribution. Here, complexities arise from:
1. Inconsistencies among how CPOs order products across different countries and brands
2. The order entry process from global to local SAP instances
3. The hand-offs and sign-off requirements from PharmOps and PSC.
Figure 20: TechOps Order Fulfilment Process
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Although the high level process is similar for most products, each brand, product, and SKU have their
own deviations in the end-to-end production and distribution. However, when we look at the information
flows, we see differences that are less logical. For example, depending on the product, location and
planner, users may have several different ways of tracking and scheduling the product. Each planner has
their own method of determining the product schedules, some use Excel, some MS Project, etc. This lack
of standardization makes it difficult to track a product end-to-end, and even more difficult to hand off to
new users. The information flow adds to the organizational/process complexity.
To develop an accurate picture of the process complexity, we looked at two products that encompass a
good sample of the breadth of Novartis's future production pipeline. For confidentiality reasons actual
names and numbers are not used, but the relative proportions are.
To conduct the product case studies, we interviewed people involved in the operations of the product
including the PU head, Life-Cycle manager, and Production Planners. We mapped the product flow and
the information flow for each product to help define the Process Complexity of each product. From this
exercise, we can concretely see from just two products the amount of NVA embedded in the end-to-end
system stemming from the batched design of the production process.
6.1 Product 1: Small molecule product with high growth potential
The first product ("Product I") is a small molecule product. This product has large growth projections
over the next several years, and so TechOps IQP has launched global project looking to reduce the overall
production lead time for this product. Initial results show dramatic opportunity for improvement.
Figure 21 represents the global product flow of product 1. This product has 4 key raw materials that are
sourced from various suppliers. The drug substance (DS) is manufactured in two different ChemOps
facilities. The DS from both facilities is then shipped to the storage hub. All the DS is built to plan in a
push system based on a consolidated global forecast. When customer orders are received, PharmOps then
requests the DS from PSC, who owns the inventory to manufacture the drug product (DP) and finished
product (FP).
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Figure 21: Product 1 Production Process
The information flow starts much earlier than the physical product flow. CPOs send their forecast to
PSC, where forecasts are compiled and strategic plans (-5 years out) for production are made. In this
process, forecasts are received in different ways from the CPOs and each planner has their own way of
compiling the forecasts. Operational (2-3 years) and tactical (1 year) plans are made. ChemOps produces
to plan. When raw material (RM) is received, production begins. Each major step in the process has
QA/QC inspections and batch records that need to be signed off. Regulations are very strict with batch
records, and again the process of physically filling out the batch record is different from site to site. Some
plants have automated systems while others are more manual. Batch record accuracy is so important that
metrics are actually measured on how correct the batch record was filled out. Technically, the manual
reviews of the batch record are considered NVA in the process, yet are an important metric at the site
level. While regulations require precise batch records, these additional steps can easily be completed with
information systems eliminating the error-prone manual labor.
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Figure 22: Product 1 Information Flow
Figure 23: Product 1 Information flow for Push Process
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Figure 24: Product 1 Information Flow for Pull Process
When we map the value stream, the process complexity becomes more obvious. As we see from Figure
25, a production process that has a critical path of 24 days currently has a lead time of 200 days. That
yields a process complexity ratio (NVA/VA) of 9! In other words there is 9 times the NVA than there is
VA. The target is to move the complexity ratio down to 3.
100 days
33 days
60 days 52 days 26 days
[6d 7d 18d
Figure 25: Product 1 Value Stream Map
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Because each product is different, the complexity ratio is great way to measure how well the process is
functioning and keeps complexity costs manageable levels.
6.2 Product 2: Large molecule product with high value but low volume
The second product ("Product 2") is a large molecule product. This product is being developed in a
multiproduct facility, so coordination is among the various stakeholders are important. Organizationally
the development model for this product requires additional management because the product is split
between clinical and commercial production divisions: Development and Supply Chain, respectively. So
a lot of coordination and communication is necessary to keep the product managers aligned. The
communication study presented in Chapter 7 shows how those two roles in particular (the Life-Cycle
Manager and Operational Planner) are responsible for 90% of this coordination, which can lead to
resource bottlenecks we saw in the generic model in Chapter 3, when there is not visibility across the
supply chain.
Currently, only a small percentage of Product 2 is for commercial distribution. The rest is for Phase 3
clinical trials. What makes this particularly complicated is that demand for the clinical product is much
more unstable than the commercial product. Doctors are able to change number of dosages and sample
sizes very quickly during clinical trial, and the production lines need to be flexible to those needs. This
creates another need for open communication across TechOps divisions, and end-to-end product
ownership. Additionally, Novartis needs to be flexible to support the pipeline as the demand becomes
commercial.
6.2.1 Physical Flow
Similar to the small molecule products, the push-pull boundary of the large molecule product is between
DS and DP manufacturing. For large molecule products, since they are made from proteins, the strategic
raw material is the working cell bank (WCB). The working cell bank is housed internally at Novartis
Biologics Process Science and Production group (NBxPSP). Although the product moves to 3 different
locations in the process, the distance travelled is actually quite small compared to the small molecule
products. The bottleneck in production process comes from the centrifuge machine during the DS
manufacturing.
45
Figure 26: Product 2 Production Process Flow Diagram
6.2.2 Information Flow
Again, like the small molecule product, the information flow begins well before the production process.
With this drug in particular, because it is a lunch product, the coordination between PSC and Site
operations is quite tight, and there is a lot of communication between these groups. However, as the
model suggests, the effectiveness of the communication is hindered by the Organization/Process
complexity and resource constraints, thus as the product comes out of launch phase, Novartis need to be
careful not to lose this level of communication.
Figure 27: Product 2 Information Flow Diagram
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Information flow begins with the demand forecast and the strategic plan. Because the product is made in
a multiproduct facility, it is coordinated with other product lines. A reorder point is set by the planner in
their own local system, which needs to be manually coordinated with the inventory management system.
If RM is low, they will call several people to coordinate placing the order. They order is confirmed by
NBxPSP offline and then the order is placed in the system to book the available WCB. This begins the
coordination of the information and the physical product flow. NBxPSP provides required batch
information and documentation on available WCB to PSC. PSC completes outbound orders in SAP for
BPO and sends outbound documentation to both BPO and NBxPSP. Shipment documentation is received
with the physical product. There is also a separate system at the BPO facility that tract the RM sorting.
Once the DS is manufactured and shipped to the hub, a stock transfer is done in SAP from BPO to the
PSC hub. Then DP/FP is manufactured, again with batch records processed locally, using local standards
and equipment. The physical product stays in Switzerland but the ownership of the product moves
between departments, which make information coordination particularly important.
6.3 Application of Model with TechOps Process Complexity
When we look at both the Product 1 & 2 processes through the model, we see multiple points where
process complexity hinders communication effectiveness and brings about conflicting interests, which in
turn causes the system difficult to manage. Based on our discussion with PU heads and technology leads
at Novartis, there are have been several production changes that cause issues. And we found that the
more complex the process, and thus the less end-to-end visibility, the higher the likelihood of production
changes to cause productions issues, again tying directly back to the model.
Product 1 is a great example of the complexities in the physical process flow. The amount of NVA is a
direct result of production growth in organizational structure that is divided by functions. As Wilson &
Perumal express repeatedly in their book, we cannot separate the complexities of the system, they are all
interrelated. The amount of NVA in Product 1 production is a great example of where organizational and
process complexities collide bringing about a costly process. Organizationally there are numerous
suppliers and multiple facilities. Process-wise, there are multiple batch processes and variations of the
product. ChemOps handles production based on the network, while PharmOps production is based on the
individual sites. Since the processes are different and have different priorities, without end-to-end
ownership, standard coordination, and open communication it is hard to understand the downstream
effects of changes. This causes additional confusion on coordination because, as we will see in the next
chapter, there is very little communication between the ChemOps and PharmOps globally. While the IQP
group helps improve processes at the sites, they do not ultimately own the implementation and
sustainability of that process. As the demand for this product grows for the future, TechOps will need to
adapt their organization so they will not fall in to the negative loop the model illustrates.
Product 2 is a great example of complexities in the information flow. The first point of contention is
simply that the strategic planner is responsible for one product in this facility, where the operational
planner is trying to optimize the production process unit, with the multiple products. They thus have
conflicting metrics. As we look further into the information flow, we see multiple information systems
being used, that are not always in sync. The enterprise planning system has multiple instances. PSC is
using the global instance where BPO and PharmOps use their local instances. The operational planner,
for this PU uses MS Project to manage the plan, and then has to reenter information into SAP. Other
planners for other process units use their own home grown spreadsheets. While Novartis has
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sophisticated software available, the adoption rate is low because the users are not held accountable for
using the system. Additionally, IT is not judged on the fulfillment of the end user requirements of the
system. With high value products, data accuracy and trust in the system is imperative. As Gailbraith
suggests, Novartis must build effective vertical information management system (1974) to combat the of
the Organizational/Process complexity and grow for the future.
Complexity can be a competitive advantage. For example, the functional operational network of Novartis
allows issues to be isolated at a single site. However, global management still needs to be aware of the
occurrence and severity (how much they affect other process steps) of each issue, so they can react in a
timely and effective way to prevent customer service issues.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter we looked at the process complexity in TechOps. We case studied two products: a small
molecule product and a large molecule product. We discussed the physical product flow and the
information flows and showed that there is a lot of room for complexity reduction. Production issues
stemming from poor process visibility again show how TechOps fits with the model, and helps form
recommendations for further changes.
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7 Chapter 7: Understanding Communication Effectiveness through a
Communications Study
Communication is an important factor in any business. In the late 1980s and early 1990s (and continuing
into the 2 1s" century) Thomas Allen pioneered studies that quantified the effect of distance, organizational
structure, and building architecture on communication. While much of the focus of his and subsequent
studies have been on Product Development and Engineering, we can use the same techniques to
understand the communication frequency, media and purpose in the Operations group as well. This study
will answer the following questions:
* How do people in TechOps truly communicate with each other?
* What media are they using? Are forms of communication going underutilized?
* How and how often do people communicate across departments and sites?
* Are the right people getting connected? Where are the gaps?
The results from the communication study give us a concrete idea of the communication how they affect
the impact of supply issues at a global level and tie directly back to the dynamic model.
7.1 Participation
The target participants of the study include directors in Global TechOps. Namely, the heads of each
division: ChemOps, PharmOps, BPO, External Supply and PSC, and all their direct reports. Then to
coordinate with the product case studies, and understand the differences in communication from product
specific teams to global teams, we asked people involved with the production of Product I and 2 at the
local level to participate. This included resources in PSC responsible for strategic planning and marketing
coordination, operational and tactical planners, PU Heads, QA Analysts, and IT. A total of 105 people
were requested to participate, of which 62 did.
Requested Participants by Department
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Supply
8%
Figure 28: Department Breakdown of Requested Participant
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Survey Part 2 - Participation Breakdown
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Figure 29: Department Breakdown of Actual Participants
7.2 Survey Design
The study was designed to maximize participation. Therefore, we broke the survey into two parts. The
first part was a self-assessment where users were asked what forms of media they use to communicate,
and how often they communicate with other departments (See Appendix B for detailed survey
information). The second part was a daily log. For two weeks, participants were asked to select the
people that they interacted with throughout the day, and indicate how they talked to each other. The
media choices were:
* Face-to-Face
* Phone (including voicemail you have left and received)
* Email
* Instant messenger (IM)
* SharePoint (share documents, updating schedules)
* Fax/Memo (including inter office mail)
* Other
Figure 30 shows the percent breakdown of the media that is used to communicate. Email is used 50% of
the time and Face-to-Face used 25% of the time. Other types of media, such as IM and SharePoint are
rarely used.
Media Email
w Phone
*Face-to-Face
SIM
a SharePoint
Figure 30: Communication Media Amount
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7.3 Assumptions and Caveats
We are taking the participants inputs and extrapolating for the entire population. There are some cases
where there are not enough responses to make a strong conclusion, so those are eliminated from the
analysis.
While other studies that have been done typically have months worth of data, we unfortunately did not
have the time to continue the study for several months. Therefore, we are assuming that this information
is representative of longer term communication patterns. Furthers studies need to be done to confirm
these patterns. However, the results were very consistent with observations and internal sentiment and
accepted by the executive team.
7.4 Results
The communication study results show us what factors affect communication across the organization.
We specifically looked at: departments, product teams, organizational level, and physical distance
between participants.
7.4.1 Self-Assessment Results
At an aggregate level (looking at all departments together and the global and brand teams together), we
see that most communication is scheduled and not ad hoc. Additionally, while the majority of
communication is through email, this media is mostly used for on-going business and administrative
tasks, while new ideas and technology are discussed face-to-face (See Figures 31-33).
Face-to-Face
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Business/ Administrative Technology/ New Idea
M Scheduled U Unscheduled
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Figure 31: Breakdown of Face-to-Face Communication
72% Scheduled, 28% Unscheduled, 43% Business Administrative, 57% New Technology/Idea
Figure 32: Breakdown of Phone Communication
38% Scheduled, 62% Unscheduled, 66% Business Administrative, 34% New Technology/Idea
Figure 33: Breakdown of Email Communication Daily Log Results
8% Scheduled, 92% Unscheduled, 69% Business Administrative, 31% New Technology/Idea
7.4.2 Daily Log Results
To analyze the results of the daily log, we construct various Allen curves and netgraphs (heat maps of
communication activity) (Allen & Henn, 2007). To create Allen curves, we look at pairs, the likelihood
that the two people communicate with each other. In other words, the probability of communication is
the percent chance that the pair of resources communicates on a given day. The 23% mean probability
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implies that each pair in the global group has only 23% chance of communicating with each other
throughout the day.
7.4.2.1 Allen Curves
If we look at the Allen curve of all the participants, we do see a downward trend as distance increases.
Although, it not quite as steep as originally expected base on the studies on engineers, so we breakdown
the data further into Department to understand where the trend is coming from.
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Figure 34: Allen Curve - All Participants
We can map the communication events as a Poisson process, and thus we get an exponential probability
density function of the communication frequencies.
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Figure 35: Allen Curve by Department
With the operational departments (BPO, ChemOps, PharmOps and External Supply), we see the same
downward sloping trend as distance increases. However with thefunctional groups of External Supply
and PSC, we see that probability of communication is almost independent of distance.
This gives us a valuable insight into promoting cross-functional communication across the operational
departments: incentives must be concretely put in place to promote additional communication. As
Galbraith suggests multi-national companies must design lateral coordination and create rules and
incentives around for integrating roles, creating liaisons and direct contact (Galbraith, 1974). PSC and
External Supply resources own product life-cycles and therefore coordinate with various people across
the supply chain. However, there are no metrics in place to measure the effectiveness of this
communication or how effectively they coordinate the groups over time. There are no incentives in place
for the operational groups to also communicate, which build trust in the system and across parties. Only
one cross-functional meeting is scheduled annually with the site heads of the various functions.
Additionally, as we see from the model, the amount of process and organizationally complexity in the
system creates a negative reinforcing loop decreasing the communication effectiveness.
7.4.2.2 Netgraphs
Another insightful way of looking at the data is through netgraphs, or heat graphs of communication.
Again we can see from these netgraphs, intra-departmental communication is more likely than cross-
departmental communication, even across distances (See Figure 36).
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Figure 36: Netgraph by Department
If we look at the trends by organizational level, we see similar characteristics: strong activity within
departments but little cross-functional communication, especially among the higher level executives.
Netgraph by Organizational Position
Figure 37: Netgraph by Position
Again, looking at communication by organizational level (Global head, Site Heads, PU Heads, etc.)
implies that cross-functional communication at the global level needs to be driven strictly by incentives,
roles and responsibilities.
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Additionally, when we drill into the results at an individual level, we see that certain roles and project
members drive up the global averages. In other words, the resources that have specific incentives to
communicate, through their job function and KPIs, are more likely to communicate cross-functionally,
which make sense intuitively. Initially, these resources has a positive impact on the overall-cross-
function communication, but eventually they become constrained and create a bottleneck in the system.
When we look back at tiger teams in the model, the amount of cross-functional communication not only
increases, but issues are solved in much shorter period of time. However, as tiger teams perpetuate,
resources are constrained and schedule pressure drives to additional organizational complexity, which
counteracts the positive effect of communication. Therefore, the management of these resources are key
to sustainable future growth.
This is true also for the key performance indicators (KPIs) in the system. KPIs in TechOps are separated
by the operation, and have not been globally optimized, Thus have a negatice impact on the organization
as a whole, especially if we are looking to increase the end-to-end visibility. But without globally optimal
KPIs, it is hard for the leaders to know the true state of the business.
7.5 Application of the Model on TechOps Communication Effectiveness
When we combine the results of the communications study with the product case studies, the dynamic
model is a good representation of the future state of the business, if organizational changes are not made..
Therefore, we can use knowledge to make recommendations that helps TechOps control the
organizational/process complexity and increase communication effectiveness and resource planning in
such a way as to help create an organization that has control over fire fighting. The next chapter provides
the details.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we detailed the communication study conducted in the fall of 2011. The results show that
department lines and resource incentives dictate more so than physical location the amount of
communication among global TechOps resources. We showed another fit to the model where
communication effectiveness is hindered by overly complicated information processes.
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8 Chapter 8: Recommendations, Conclusions and Next Steps
We have shown that TechOps is a complex organization going through an industry transition. Therefore,
the dynamic model of production issues and supply issues is applicable. By combing the knowledge of
TechOps future goals and innovations with the organizations possible susceptibility to adverse effects of
complexity. this chapter will make recommendations for TechOps and next steps. Specifically we are
looking for a way to design the global organization is to solve the following issues:
* Poor performance - creates an inward focus as opposed to a customer focus. Leads to poor
product availability and customer service levels
* Lack of accountability - difficultly seeing trade-offs that cross functional boundaries
* Lack of information flow - no performance feedback loops for improvement
Additionally the solution must adhere to the following constraints:
1. Support Vision 2015 without losing any technical capabilities and allows for better informed
decision making
2. Reduce complexity from an organizational standpoint so other initiatives are aligned to get people
the information they need
3. Create an organization that supports the balance between functions and brands in order to not lose
technical capabilities
4. Is practical and implementable
Before we make the recommendations, we conduct a 3-Lens Analysis, to ensure that the recommendation
will not only fit the future enterprise architecture, but also fit the strategic, political and cultural aspects of
the company. By doing so, we ensure that the recommendation will be accepted and sustained.
8.1 3-Lens Analysis
A 3-lens anaylsis is a technique of analyzing organizational behavior through three distinct, but
complementary points of view: Strategic Design, Cultural and Political. The Strategic Design Lens sees
organizations as machines; mechanical systems created to achieve a common goal where actions come
through planning. Cultural Lens sees organizations as institutions; Symbolic systems of values and
routines where actions come through habit. Finally, the The Political Lens sees organizations as contests;
social systems that compete for resources where actions come through power. This qualitative analysis
will help shape our assumptions and relationships in the dynamic model and the recommendations.
8.1.1 Strategic Design
The strategic vision of TechOps is to become a "world-class, patient-driven supply network." TechOps is
a cost center, responsible for all manufacturing and distribution for Novartis Pharma, but not responsible
for the development or sales of the products. They are continuously trying to find ways to make the
supply chain more efficient and have a goal of 10% cost reduction across the board year over year. As
stated by the leader during and IQP workshop, "the goal is to optimize the future of Novartis, not modify
the past."
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To that effect, TechOps is very strategically aware that their product portfolio is changing: their largest
brand is going off patent in a few years, and while the volumes will not decrease dramatically, the
revenues will. In addition the market for biologics, orphan drugs, and customized medicine is growing
rapidly, which equates to lower production volumes and more complex production. Thus they want to
create a more agile organization at the global level.
8.1.2 Cultural
As a whole, TechOps is very conscious of the 2015 Vision. The employee survey showed an
overwhelming percentage of people (over 90%) thought that the vision and goals were clear and
communicated effectively.
POO and Lean have been embedded into the daily lives of the local operations. Employees express their
desire to be a company with continuous improvements. There is, however different intensity of this
culture at different levels of the organization; and this poses a challenge for organizational change. The
study of organizational behavior and process has proven that in order for organizational change to be
successful, the motivations and benefits must be clearly communicated and all parties involved need to be
aligned and supportive (Mortensen, 2010). Utilizing the strong cultural ties to "Lean" and process
oriented organization (POO) to explain the potential changes to the global organization proved extremely
affective during the 6-months at Novartis; especially at the lower levels, because it is in a language to
which they could relate. As for communication at the higher level of the organization, Lean language is
also affective. To discuss long term consequences, the dynamic model is particularly helpful to foster
organizational change, as it shows the undesirable consequences if no changes are done.
8.1.3 Political
Organizational change always brings about political tension in any company. Global TechOps' "blue
sky" vision eliminates the functional groups entirely and creates a purely horizontal organization. There
was obvious push back from the heads of these groups, but they had accurate concerns that a purely
divisional organization tends to lose functional expertise. Additionally, while the goal is to prepare for
continuous manufacturing, it will be many years before a majority of Novartis's products are produced
using this technique. Therefore, instead of dramatic change, a gradual change would be much more
widely accepted. A solution must clearly address the concerns of balancing ownership of the end-to-end
process and maintaining technical knowledge within a process unit.
8.2 Recommendation: Organization Changes and Tools
We have shown that Novartis's process complexities and organization complexities hinder cross-
functional communication which, in turn can lead to supply issues are TechOps move to their future state.
However, as we see from the 3-lens analysis, moving directly into an organization structure that is based
solely on product lines would not fit strategically, culturally and politically within the organization.
Furthermore, since TechOps has been so historically divided across functions, there are few resources that
have the experience and insight across the various operations; TechOps needs to build these capabilities
into their organization over time.
We aim to find a solution that has both short term and long term benefits. In the short term it needs to fix
the supply issues and help improve customer service levels. In the long term it needs to synchronize the
supply chain to decrease reaction time and increase flexibility and build end-to-end visibility and
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capabilities in preparation for continuous manufacturing, and balance brand optimization with technical
expertise.
We recommend that TechOps explore the enhancement of the Supply Chain Brand Lead role into an
established owner of the end-to-end supply process for identified products, look into establishing a
Manufacturing Services and Technology (MS&T) group that will own technical process changes
among the functions and revise the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to optimize performance end-to-
end, be brand focused, expose complexity and trigger proactive responses. All of these changes should be
facilitated by additional communication tools and incentives. Figure 38 gives a visual to the new
organization and Figure 39 gives the recommended implementation plan.
C 0
o E
I= CU
29
.E W
CU 
.6
49 03:
incenves to
promote Cross-
functional
*E cocmmunication
E
.1
I TL
KPi that balanceBrand needs with
Operational
metrics
Figure 38: Recommended Practical Vision of TechOps Organizational Structure
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Figure 39: Recommended Implementation Plan
These recommendations directly address the issues at hand:
To attack poor performance, enhance the role of the Pharma Supply Chain Brand Lead such that they
truly own the strategic vision and implementation of Lean principles on-going. Giving ownership to this
role will create a counterpart for the PU heads.
To combat the lack of accountability, establish a Global Manufacturing Services & Technology group
to set change management standards and share best practices. To diminish the lack of information flow
creates Global KPIs that optimize performance end-to-end, are brand focused, expose complexity and
trigger proactive responses. It would be particularly helpful to set complexity ratio targets for each
product and process. This requires determining NVA and VA thus creating a unified metric to show the
health of the organization.
8.3 Communication
As Novartis builds trust in the TechOps organization, and reduces the impact of the Organization/Process
face with the changes mentioned in Section 8.2, communication of the new roles and new KPIs and
communication incentive throughout the change process will be a crucial element to the success of the
recommended plan as Figure 40 shows.
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Figure 40: Visual Interpretation of Recommendation Interdependencies
By using Novartis's own "Operational Excellence" model, management can create quantitative KPIs and
incentives on communication and information sharing. For example, resources may be reviewed on use
of IT tools, participation in networking events, and number of times they report an issue constructively.
When communicating the changes to TechOps on a broader scale, management should execute the
following steps (Mortensen, 2010)
- Describe main features of the new roles
- Show fit with strategy
- Demonstrate how the organization will evolve with the future vision
- Identify current problems & explain how new structure solves them
- Secure support from key stake holders
- Continuously link to the company culture and values
- Reward appropriate behavior during transition
- Convey sense of continuity & stability
8.4 Follow-on Studies
We have proved that Novartis can benefit greatly from Process/Organization Complexity reduction, and
better project management and communication with regards to the product launch and production change
processes.
To continue on this path, we recommend TechOps engage in three additional studies in this area:
1. Deep-dive into project management and resource planning - How are resources allocated to the
various projects and initiatives? How many projects is one person working on at a given time?
What is their utilization? Are project timelines reasonable or will they further persist in the Tiger
Team culture? How much project overhead is there? How can we reduce the project overhead?
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2. Understanding of projects outcomes - What are the lessons learned from projects? How are they
being used to improve future projects? What requirements do managers have to ensure
employees are recording outcomes and lessoned learned?
3. Forecasting improvements - what are the forecast errors'? How is the global team consolidating
product demand forecast? What is the impact of the bull-whip effect? How much of it is coming
from internal phantom ordering and how much is external?
8.5 Summary
In this thesis, we proved how the dynamic, nonlinear model shows how product launches, production
change requests, production issues and supply issues relate in a global manufacturing organization. We
proved the model was a good fit to Novartis Pharma TechOps. By studying its organizational structure,
case studying two product processes and conducting a communication study we revealed the
organizational and process complexities and inefficient communication structure. We showed that
TechOps matched the symptoms of an overly complex organization, and if not improved, may fall victim
of the Tiger Team phenomenon. Because it is a good fit to the model, we then made recommendations to
combat the specific issues. By also incorporating a 3-lens analysis, we ensure that the recommendation
will be accepted and sustained. Finally, we give suggestions for follow-up studies in the field of
complexity reduction.
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APPENDIX A: Communication Study Details
Part 1: Self Assessment
= Your name (First and Last)
= Department/Location in TechOps where you work (Select one)
- Main form of communication with others
- Topic (Select one)
- Business/ Administrative: communication for coordination; scheduling meetings,
discussing progress reports, budgeting, etc.
- Technology/ New Idea: communication for information; discussing process
improvements, fixing unexpected production issues, brainstorming, elaborating
on new ideas, etc.
- Scheduled (Select one)
- Scheduled: meeting set on calendar, regular TC
- Unscheduled: Impromptu chat, not planned
- Level of interaction with other departments (scale 1-10)
- 1-3 : Minimal interaction (less than monthly)
- 4-7: Moderate interaction (between monthly and weekly)
- 8-10: A lot of interaction (more than weekly, possibly daily)
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Figure 41: Communication Study Part 1 Survey Design
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Part 2: Daily Log
" Names of possible resources are arranged in alphabetical order by the first name
- To find a person, select the letter range of their first name and a list will appear
- Lists contain a sampling people, so you may not find everyone you have interacted with, but
please fill out as thorough as possible
" Select the people that you have interacted with throughout the day, and indicated how you talked
to them (check all boxes that apply)
- Face-to-Face
- Phone (including voicemail you have left and received)
- Email
- Instant messenger (IM)
- SharePoint (share documents, updating schedules)
- Fax/Memo (including inter office mail)
- Other
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Figure 42: Communication Study Part 2 Survey Design
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